

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 HELSINKI 2296

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PACT, US, UR
SUBJECT: US-SOVIET CAT -- JULY 18TH PLENARY

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE FIRST PLENARY OF THE THIRD
US-SOVIET CAT ROUND, BOTH SIDES SUMMARIZED AREAS OF
AGREEMENT FROM THE LAST ROUND, AND GELB MADE THE CASE
FOR REACHING PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT IN THIS ROUND THAT
COULD LEAD TO SPECIFIC AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT ROUND.
MENDELEVICH USED HIS OPENING STATEMENT TO ARGUE THAT
POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA WERE OF "CENTRAL" IMPORTANCE IN
THIS ENTERPRISE, BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONLY MEANS OF
ESTABLISHING SUPPLIER-RECIPIENT CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR
RESTRAINT. HE CONCLUDED BY ARGUING THAT WHILE WORK ON ALL
THREE ELEMENTS COULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE MUST REACH
AGREEMENT ON A SET OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA BEFORE WE CAN
REACH AGREEMENT ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS.

GELB REPLIED BY ARGUING THAT WE MUST MOVE FORWARD ON
BOTH POLITICAL/LEGAL AND MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA AT THE
SAME TIME AND ON THE CONCRETE REGIONAL APPROACH IN
ORDER TO DEVELOP A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE SITUATIONS
WE FACE IN VARIOUS REGIONS. POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA
ALONG, OR EVEN TREATED ON A SEPARATE TRACK, WOULD ONLY
LEAD TO AMBIGUITY AND COULD NOT TELL US OBJECTIVELY WHAT
RESTRAINT SHOULD BE. MENDELEVICH REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT
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MEAN TO RELEGATE MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA TO SECONDARY
STATUS BY ARGUING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL/LEGAL
CRITERIA, THAT HE AGREED THAT BOTH WERE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
OF THE SOLUTIONS TO ARMS TRANSFER PROBLEM.

GELB ALSO DESCRIBED THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF OUR
REGIONAL APPROACH, LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A REGIONAL
WORK PROGRAM, INCLUDING:

-- JOINT US-SOVIET PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE AYACUCHO INITIATIVE;
-- A BILATERAL SUPPLIER RESTRAINT REGIME TO SUPPORT LATIN AMERICAN SELF-RESTRAINT;
-- A BILATERAL DEMARCHE TO MEMBER STATES OF THE OAU FOR RESTRAINT IN AFRICA;
-- WORK TOWARD BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA THAT COULD FORM THE BASIS OF OUR DEIALOGUE WITH AFRICAN NATIONS.

MAKING THE CASE FOR URGENCY, GELB NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD DECIDE IN OCTOBER WHETHER THERE WOULD BE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN US ARMS TRANSFERS IN FY-1979, AND WOULD REVIEW HIS ARMS TRANSFER POLICY NEXT SPRING, BASED ON THE COOPERATION OF OTHER SUPPLIERS. MENDELEVICH SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO LOOKING FOR RESULTS BY THE NEXT ROUND AND ALSO DID NOT WANT ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS.

MENDELEVICH WAS EITHER TAKING A STEP BACKWARD OR MAKING A TACTICAL MANEUVER BY ARGUING THAT "WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK IN PARALLEL IN ALL DIRECTIONS, BUT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WORK ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS WILL BE OF A PREPARATORY CHARACTER UNTIL POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA HAVE BEEN ADOPTED." AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND HE HAD AGREED TO GIVE EQUAL STATUS TO POLITICAL/LEGAL AND MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA. GELB MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT AGREE ON ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER AND URGED MENDELEVICH TO MAKE PROPOSALS ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA, AS WE
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WOULD ON POLITICAL/LEGAL. END SUMMARY.

1. FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF CAT BEGAN WITH SOVIET PRESENTATION WHICH RESTATED THEIR EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA, ALTHOUGH NOT TO EXCLUSION OF PARALLEL PROGRESS ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA AND REGIONAL SITUATIONS. AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, REITERATED AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS PRESENTATION HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS OF SECOND ROUND OF CAT IN MAY. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON ENDING THE ARMS RACE. FURTHER, THESE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE 1972 PRINCIPLES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONS.

2. MENDELEVICH TOOK NOTE OF SSOD AND STRESSED THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE USSR HAD ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AT THIS KIND OF INTERNATIONAL LEVEL. IT HAD DONE SO IN A POSITIVE LIGHT, AS REFLECTED IN FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S SPEECH AND IN SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON PRACTICAL STEPS TO END THE ARMS RACE.

MENDELEVICH FURTHER STRESSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACT THAT SOVIET CONSIDERATION OF CAT ISSUES HAD MOVED TO A "HIGH STATE LEVEL" FOLLOWING THE MAY ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE US. ACCORDINGLY, AT THE SSOD THE SOVIET DELEGATION SOUGHT TO COOPERATE WITH THE US DELEGATION AND DID NOT PROVOKE ANY CONFRONTATION. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE SSOD FINAL DOCUMENT, ESPECIALLY PARAGRAPHS 22, 85, AND 88.

3. MENDELEVICH NOTED THAT WE HAD NOW ACCUMULATED SOME CAPITAL IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF OUR LAST MEETING. AT THE PRESENT SESSION WE SHOULD ACQUIRE MORE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S INSTRUCTIONS, THE MAIN CENTRAL TASK, BUT NOT THE ONLY ONE, WAS DEVELOP-
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MENT AND AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA, I.E.,
WHAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS WOULD BE PERMISSIBLE AND

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FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

WHICH INPERMISSIBLE. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OTHER DIRECTIONS OF WORK, MENDDELEVICH SAID HE WANTED TO CONCENTRATE NOW ON POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA AS THE CENTRAL PROBLEM. SPEAKING FRANKLY, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A COMPLETE COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS ON THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THESE CRITERIA WERE NOT JUST WORDS OR PHILOSOPHY, BUT A VERY IMPORTANT PRACTICAL MEANS OF RESTRAINING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.

4. MENDELEVICH MADE THE ANALOGY BETWEEN CAT AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. A MAIN DIFFERENCE WAS THAT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS TO BE BANNED COMPLETELY WHEREAS WE DID NOT SAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. WE COULD FORESEE THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS WOULD CONTINUE, AND OUR TASK WAS TO REGULATE THEM. WE COULD SEEK TO FIND THE MOST DANGEROUS ELEMENTS AND ELIMINATE THEM, BUT NOT STOP THE PROCESS ENTIRELY. ANOTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAT AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION WAS THAT RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DID NOT TAKE ANYTHING AWAY FROM THE NUCLEAR POWERS AND REQUIRED ONLY RENUNCIATION BY THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. BUT RENUNCIATION GAVE RISE TO
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CERTAIN FEELINGS IN THOSE COUNTRIES WICH DO EXIST. AS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS, OUR PROBLEM WAS DIRECTED AT LIMITING TO A CERTAIN DEGREE THE DESIRE OF MANY COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE THESE ARMS. IF WE WERE TO IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON THE RECEIPT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, WE SHOULD SHOW THEM THAT THESE RESTRICTIONS HAVE A REAL AND UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED BASIS. ONLY CRITERIA COULD ACHIEVE THIS POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. IT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED BY A DECISION, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SUCH AND SUCH AN AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE SUPPLIED. IT COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA BASED ON UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES AND DOCUMENTS. THESE CRITERIA MUST BE VERY PERSUASIVE. NONE OF THE TECHNICAL CRITERIA COULD ACHIEVE THIS POLITICAL GOAL.

5. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS DESCRIBED THE CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA. BUT THIS WAS NOT ALL. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH CRITERIA WOULD INFLUENCE NOT JUST THE RECIPIENTS, BUT THE SUPPLIERS AS WELL AND THIS COULD FAVOR DETENTE AND IMPROVE THIS SIDE OF OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS. THE DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF THESE CRITERIA COULD PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND DISTRUST. THIS WAS BECAUSE EACH SIDE WOULD KNOW THAT THE OTHER WAS ACTING NOT ON THE BASIS OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, BUT ON THE BASIS OF CRITERIA. FURTHER, WE COULD DIMINISH THE GENERAL LEVEL OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND STATES WOULD KNOW BEFOREHAND WHAT THEY COULD AND COULD NOT HOPE FOR. THE SOVIET SIDE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD ELIMINATE THE DESIRE ON THE PART

OF SOME RECIPIENTS TO CLAIM ARMAMENTS. MENDELEVICH ADDED THAT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION IN THE SPHERE OF CERTAIN MARKETS COULD AFFECT NOT JUST
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TWO COUNTRIES BUT OTHERS AS WELL.

6. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT ALL OF THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET SIDE GAVE SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO OTHER AREAS. MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS WERE ALSO IMPORTANT. BUT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PERSUADED THAT THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS COULD COMPLEMENT BUT NOT REPLACE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA AT THE BEGINNING "WOULD" BE BETTER FOLLOWED BY DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS. BUT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT PUT THE QUESTION AS A DEMAND AND THIS IS WHY IT USED THE WORD "WOULD." WE COULD WORK ON ALL QUESTIONS IN PARALLEL, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL WORK HAS, IN A CERTAIN SENSE, A PRELIMINARY CHARACTER AS LONG AS POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA ARE NOT ADOPTED. THIS WAS BECAUSE MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS, IN THEIR FINAL VERSION, COULD NOT BE ADOPTED UNLESS WE HAD A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA AND WHERE AND HOW THEY WOULD BE APPLIED. NEVERTHELESS, MENDELEVICH REPEATED, HE COULD ONLY REPEAT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO WORK IN PARALLEL, AS HE HAD SAID. THIS DID NOT MEAN WE WOULD BE LESS ACTIVE IN SOME OTHER AREA.

7. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PRESENTED ITS DRAFT POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA. NATURALLY, THE SOVIETS NOW EXPECTED THE US REACTION SINCE, AT THE LAST ROUND, THERE HAD ONLY BEEN A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. HE WANTED TO DRAW THE US ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS PREPARED ON AN OBJECTIVE BASIS, BASED ON THE UN CHARTER, AGREED DEFINITIONS OF AGGRESSION, AND THE LIKE. THERE WAS ALSO THE UNRESOLUTION, NUMBER A-32451 OF DECEMBER 19, 1977, ON THE CONSOLIDATION AND
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DEEPENING OF DETENTE. THUS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ONLY USED THOSE PRINCIPLES ALREADY AGREED ON BY MEMBERS OF THE UN AND BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES. FURTHER, THE SOVIET

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EXDIS

SIDE CONSTANTLY SPOKE OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA SINCE THIS WAS NOT JUST A JURIDICAL MATTER, BUT ALSO POLITICAL. AS MENDELEVICH HAD NOTED AT THE LAST ROUND, THESE CRITERIA WOULD BE UNIVERSAL AND APPLY TO ALL SUPPLIERS AND ALL RECIPIENTS WITHOUT EXCEPTION, IRRESPECTIVE OF ALLIANCES. THIS WAS BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF JUST OUR TWO SIDES, BUT OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. WE COULD NOT SAY TO THE WORLD THAT CERTAIN CRITERIA APPLIED TO SOME COUNTRIES, AND OTHER CRITERIA TO OUR ALLIES. THERE COULD BE NO SELECTIVITY IN THIS. (NOTE: IN THIS CONTEXT, MENDELEVICH SAID HE HAD REVIEWED THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE SOVIET DRAFT POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA AND BELIEVED THE WORDS "LAWFUL" AND "UNLAWFUL" WERE PERHAPS TOO HARSH AND DID NOT HAVE THE SAME FORCE IN RUSSIAN).

8. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT THE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE WERE DIRECTED AT THE FUTURE AND WERE NOT YET FIXED IN AN ADOPTED DOCUMENT. THUS, THERE WAS FLEXIBILITY AND, SINCE THEY WERE NOT THE ONLY POSSESSORS OF TRUTH, THEY WOULD EXAMINE US PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD. WE COULD CARRY ON OUR WORK ON CRITERIA IN TWO WAYS: LIST ALL THE CRITERIA OR DEVELOP EACH IN A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH AS FOR EXAMPLE WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO

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SAY WHICH APPROACH WAS BETTER. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD START WITH A LIST AND THE QUESTION OF THE DETAILED FORMULA COULD BE DETERMINED IN THE WORKING GROUP. IF WE COULD THEN ADOPT THE CRITERIA AT THE NEXT ROUND, THIS WOULD BE A GREAT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

9. GELB BEGAN THE US PRESENTATION BY WELCOMING THE OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW THE CONTINUING US-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT. HE SAID THE US WILL CONDUCT THESE DISCUSSIONS IN THE SAME FRANK AND SERIOUS MANNER AS WE DID OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS. GELB SAID HE KNEW THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD DO SO AS WELL.

10. GELB REPONDED TO MENDELEVICH'S PRESENTATION BY NOTING HE WANTED TO THINK ABOUT IT BEFORE RESPONDING COMPLETELY. HE INDICATED THAT HIS PRESENTATION DID NOT DEAL WITH ALL THE POINTS MENDELEVICH HAD RAISED. BECAUSE THE SOVIET PRESENTATION WAS SO THOUGHTFUL, THE US RESERVED ITS RESPONSE UNTIL A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

11. GELB BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY RECAPPING PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID THE USG HAD CAREFULLY REVIEWED AND STUDIED THE RESULTS OF THE LAST SESSION IN MAY. THE USG HAD ASSESSED POSITIVELY THE SUBSTANTIVE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF THAT ROUND. HE SAID WHAT THE US AIMED TO DO IN THIS ROUND WAS TO GO BEYOND PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF INTENT AND TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD ACHIEVING A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE RESTRAINT OF ARMS TRANSFERS.

12. GELB STRESSED IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO TAKE STEPS TOWARD REACHING CONCRETE AGREEMENT. HE INDICATED THE PRESIDENT WILL DECIDE IN OCTOBER WHETHER THERE WILL BE
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FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN US ARMS TRANSFERS TO NON-EXEMPT COUNTRIES IN FY 1979. NEXT SPRING, GELB CONTINUED, THE PRESIDENT WILL REVIEW THE OVERALL RESTRAINT POLICY BASED ON THE COOPERATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE US HAD COME TO THIS MEETING PREPARED TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR REACHING AGREEMENT IN THREE INTER-RELATED AREAS: LEGAL/POLITICAL CRITERIA, MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA, AND SPECIFIC REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

13. GELB THEN REVIEWED RECENT EVENTS WHICH HAD TRANSPIRED SINCE THE SIDES LAST MET WHICH GAVE NEW IMPETUS TO THEIR WORK. FIRST, THE UN SSOD HAD ADOPTED A PROGRAM OF ACTION

CALLING FOR CONSULTATIONS "... AMONG MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES ON THE LIMITATION OF ALL TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS." FOR THE FIRST TIME, GELB NOTED, A UN BODY HAD SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED THE IDEA OF SEEKING RESTRAINT IN THE TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT HAD CALLED UPON SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS TO WORK ON ATTAINING THAT GOAL.

14. SECOND, GELB REFERRED TO THE JUNE 22 DECLARATION BY THE AYACUCHO SIGNATORIES WHICH REAFFIRMED THE INTENTION OF THOSE COUNTRIES TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

15. GELB SAID IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THIS INITIATIVE HAD COME FROM THE AREA OF GREATEST TENSION IN LATIN AMERICA. THE US BELIEVED IT REPRESENTED A SINCERE DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD CONCRETE MEASURES OF SELF-RESTRAINT.

16. THIRD, MEXICO HAD INITIATED AN EFFORT COMPLEMENTARY TO THE AYACUCHO DECLARATION, WITH THE PURPOSE OF GOING BEYOND THE ANDEAN REGION TO ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. IN EARLY JULY, DURING THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, GELB NOTED THAT MEXICO, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, AND ECUADOR
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HAD CIRCULATED A STATEMENT CALLING ON ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THE CARIBBEAN TO PREPARE SPECIFIC PRO-

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EXDIS

POSALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADOPTING CONCRETE MEASURES NO LATER THAN 1979. SINCE THIS STATEMENT WAS FIRST CIRCULATED, GELB SAID THE US UNDERSTOOD THAT SEVERAL OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAD ENDORSED IT. THE US EXPECTED THIS INITIATIVE WOULD RESULT IN A REGIONAL MEETING WITHIN THE COMING MONTHS.

17. TURNING NEXT TO AFRICA, GELB SAID RECENT EVENTS HAD GENERATED HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. FIRST, IN REGARD TO NAMIBIA, SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA BOTH HAD ACCEPTED THE PROPOSED NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH HAD BROUGHT IN SIGHT A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENT RULE.

18. SECOND, WITH REGARD TO ZIMBABWE, THE US WAS HOPEFUL THAT A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE COULD BE WORKED OUT IN A WAY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES.

19. FINALLY, GELB NOTED THAT THE EVENTS IN SHABA PROVINCE HAD SHOWN ONCE AGAIN THAT UNDERLYING REGIONAL TENSIONS COULD EASILY FLARE INTO ARMED CONFLICT. NEVERTHELESS, THE US FOUND IT ENCOURAGING THAT ANGOLA AND OTHER REGIONAL PARTIES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO A LESSENING OF TENSIONS IN THE AREA.

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20. GELB SAID THE USG BELIEVED THERE WERE SOME IMPORTANT LESSONS TO BE NOTED WITH RESPECT TO THE SHABA SITUATION; -- FIRST, THAT SITUATION WAS MADE POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF WHAT WE BELIEVED WERE UNWISE ARMS TRANSFERS TO A NON-NATIONAL GROUP;

-- SECOND, FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND THE US PLEDGED AT THE OUTCOME THAT THEY WOULD ASSIST MERELY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND PROTECT THE POPULATION. THESE STATES HAD KEPT THAT PROMISE AND IN A MONTH'S TIME THEY WERE OUT;

-- THIRD, THE FACT THAT THE PURPOSES WERE LIMITED AND THE PLEDGES WERE KEPT PREVENTED A SITUATION OF CONTINUING TENSION, PERHAPS INVOLVING US AND USSR INTERESTS. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE FOR EXAMPLE, GELB NOTED, WITH REGARD TO CUBAN COMBAT FORCES IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

21. ALL OF THESE EVENTS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING, GELB CONTINUE, REINFORCED THE NEED FOR THE US AND USSR TO

WORK TOGETHER EXPEDITIOUSLY.

22. TURNING NEXT TO THE QUESTION OF CRITERIA, GELB ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW THE SIDES COULD DO THEIR WORK. HE SUGGESTED TALKING ABOUT CRITERIA FIRST, BY WHICH HE MEANT BOTH POLITICAL/LEGAL AND MILITARY/TECHNICAL. HE NOTED THAT AT THE LAST MEETING MENDELEVICH HAD USED THE ANALOGY OF PLANTING SEEDS. MENDELEVICH HAD FOLLOWED THIS THOUGHT LOGICALLY BY ARGUING TODAY THAT, ONCE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA WERE AGREED UPON, THE OTHERS WOULD NATURALLY FOLLOW OR GROW FROM THE SEED.

23. GELB THEN VOICE US CONCERN THAT THIS APPROACH MIGHT
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LEAD TO A STEM WITHOUT A FLOWER. THE US WAS ATTEMPTING TO STIMULATE THE GROWTH OF THE WHOLE PLANT, JUST AS A LIVING BEING MUST GROW ALL TOGETHER IF IT WERE TO LIVE AT ALL. GELB SAID HE WAS AFRAID THERE WERE TOO MANY OCCASIONS WHERE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA HAD BEEN AGREED UPON BUT LED TO SEPARATE AND CONFLICTING BEHAVIOR. GELB THEN QUOTED PLATO: TO KNOW THE GOOD WAS TO DO THE GOOD. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARGUMENTATION ABOUT PHILOSOPHY HAD DEMONSTRATED THERE WERE MANY NOTIONS OF GOOD. BOTH THE US AND USSR BELIEVED THE UN CHARTER WAS GOOD AND YET THE CONCLUSION WAS INESCAPABLE THAT ITS PROVISIONS WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED OR INTERPRETED IN THE SAME WAY DESPITE THEIR UNIVERSALITY. BECAUSE OF THAT, THE US APPROACH HAD BEEN INJECTED WITH NEW ELEMENTS TO ENABLE A REALISTIC ARMS CONTROL EFFORT TO SUCCEED. THUS, THE US HAD TALKED ABOUT MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA AS A LEAVENING ON THE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA TO MAKE THEM MORE OBJECTIVE AND THEREBY LESS SUBJECTIVE.

24. GELB ASKED MENDELEVICH WHICH WAS EASIER TO DECIDE: WHETHER COUNTRY X WAS GOOD OR WHETHER THE SALE TO IT OF MODERN JET AIRCRAFT WAS NEW? WHICH WAS MORE OBJECTIVE?

25. GELB REASSURED MENDELEVICH OF US AGREEMENT THAT POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA WERE NOT EXCLUSIVE OF MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA AND WENT TOGETHER. THERE WAS A NEED TO MAKE BOTH JUDGEMENTS IN THE EXAMPLE HE CITED. JUST AS POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS, THE US BELIEVED MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA COULD ALSO PROVIDE THAT BASIS, BUT THAT YOU NEEDED BOTH FOR DETERMINING DECISIONS ABOUT ARMS SALES AND THAT THIS MUST BE DONE IN PARTICULAR REGIONAL CONTEXTS.

26. GELB CONTINUED THAT THE US SIDE BELIEVED ITS APPROACH

WAS PRACTICAL PRECISELY BECAUSE OF ONE OF THE POINTS

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MENDELEVICH HAD MADE THIS MORNING. MENDELEVICH HAD NOTED THAT RECIPIENT COUNTRIES WERE CONCERNED ABOUT BEING DENIED CERTAIN THINGS. THE US WAS MINDFUL OF THE NEED FOR RECIPIENT INVOLVEMENT AND HAD NO INTENTION TO IMPOSE

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FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2953

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EXDIS

THINGS ON THEM. WE INTENDED TO WORK WITH RECIPIENTS AND CONSIDER THEIR INTERESTS; OTHERWISE, RESTRAINT WOULD NOT WORK.

27. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE MUST LOOK AT DIFFERENT REGIONS, WITH SOME PREPARED TO MOVE NOW TOWARD ARMS RESTRAINT WHILE OTHERS WERE NOT SO READY. GELB EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEEDED IN A PRACTICAL WAY.

28. GELB REMINDED MENDELEVICH THAT, BASED ON HIS REMARKS IN MAY, THE USSR FULLY INTENDED TO PURSUE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL CRITERIA. JUST AS THE BURDEN WAS ON THE SOVIET SIDE TO PRODUCE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA, THE BURDEN WAS ON US TO DO MORE FIRST ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA. WE HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THESE CRITERIA IN SEPARATE WORKING GROUPS. THE US THOUGHT THAT PROGRESS WAS NECESSARY WITH RESPECT TO BOTH WORKING GROUPS. THE US

WAS PREPARED TO MAKE PROPOSALS IN EACH AND EXPECTED THE SOVIET SIDE TO MAKE PROPOSALS IN BOTH AREAS AS WELL. WE COULD THEN SEEK COMMON GROUND BETWEEN OUR TWO POSITIONS AND THE US SIDE WAS AUTHORIZED TO DO THAT. HOWEVER, GELB CAUTIONED, THE US WAS NOT PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT IN ON AREA WITHOUT AGREEMENT IN THE OTHER.

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29. ACCORDINGLY, THE US HAD EXPANDED ITS ILLUSTRATIVE MILITARY/TECHNICAL GUIDELINES, PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED TO THE SOVIETS, INTO A SET OF EIGHT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. IN THE FIRST MEETING OF THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP THE US WOULD TAKE THESE PROPOSALS. THE US WAS ALSO PREPARED TO DISCUSS, ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE BASIS, THE ACTUAL WEAPONRY TO WHICH THESE CRITERIA COULD APPLY. FINALLY, THE US WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE APPLICATION OF THESE CRITERIA TO REGIONAL MILITARY SITUATIONS. GELB THOUGHT THIS LATTER POINT SHOULD BE A SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP.

30. GELB STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE US LOOKED FORWARD TO HEARING SOVIET PROPOSALS ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA JUST AS THE US WAS PREPARED TO MAKE PROPOSALS ON POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA. THIS MUST BE A MUTUALLY REINFORCING EXERCISE IN THE WORKING GROUP. WE NEEDED TO DEVELOP A REAL BASIS TO DISCUSS THE REGIONAL APPLICATION OF CRITERIA. GELB INTRODUCED MICHEL WHO WOULD CHAIR THE POLITICAL/LEGAL WORKING GROUP FOR THE US SIDE AND WOULD COMMENT IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON THE SOVIET PRESENTATION. HE WOULD ALSO MAKE PROPOSALS ON THE FORM WHICH THE CRITERIA MIGHT TAKE. GELB THEN INTRODUCED BLECHMAN WHO WOULD PRESENT MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR THE US SIDE.

31. GELB SAID HE WAS COMING TO ANOTHER PART OF THE TRIAD; NAMELY, THE REGIONAL APPROACH. AS INDICATED AT THE LAST ROUND, THE US PLANNED TO TABLE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND FOR AFRICA, BEGINNING WITH THE AREA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA AND THE ANDEAN AYACUCHO STATES FOR LATIN AMERICA. HE NOTED MENDELEVICH HAD RIGHTLY ASKED YESTERDAY WHAT WE PLANNED TO TALK ABOUT. GELB SAID HE

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WOULD SKETCH IT FOR HIM.

32. WITH REGARD TO LATING AMERICA, THE US WOULD FOCUS IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP ON THE AYACUCHO DECLARATION STATES BUT WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. THE US HAD FORU OBJECTIVES:

--PUBLIC INDICATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE AYACUCHO INITIATIVE;

--PRIVATE INDICATION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO WORK OUT GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS TO THE AYACUCHO STATES;

--PRIVATE INDICATION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A SUPPLIER AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE THE AYACUCHO INITIATIVE;

--EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREED RESTRAINT REGIME BY THE AYACUCHO STATES, PRIVATE INDICATIONS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT WITH US ON PROPOSED NEW ARMS TRANSFER COMMITMENTS THAT RAISED QUESTION OF INCOMPATABILITY WITH THE GUIDELINES OR CRITERIA TO BE AGREED UPON.

33. GELB STRESSED THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES WERE SERIOUS, CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL. THE US WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THESE OBJECTIVES IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

--BY ILLUSTRATING HOW CRITERIA EMERGING FROM BOTH THE POLITICAL/LEGAL AND MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA WORKING GROUPS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THESE STATES;

--BY ASSESSING WHETHER THE SITUATION AMONG THE AYACUCHO STATES WAS IN ANY WAY UNIQUE AND THEREFORE CALLED FOR SPECIAL ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES ON CRITERIA;

--BY ILLUSTRATING HOW THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS.

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34. ADDRESSING MENDELEVICH PERSONALLY, GELB SAID IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF SUCH A DISCUSSION, THE BASIS WAS RIGHT THERE IN FRONT OF THEM. THE US APPROACH TO THE AYACUCHO STATES WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE AREA WAS RELATIVELY PEACEFUL AND THAT THE RECIPIENTS HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE.

25. AFRICA, GELB CAUTIONED, DIFFERED ON BOTH ACCOUNTS. THE US HAD DEFINED ITS OBJECTIVES TO FIT THAT SITUATION WHICH WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA. US OBJECTIVES HERE WERE THREE FOLD:

--TO STIMULATE REGIONAL INITIATIVES FOR RESTRAINT BY REACHING AGREEMENT HERE ON APPROACHING MEMBER STATES OF THE OAU;

--TO WORK TOWARD AGREED CRITERIA AS THE BASIS FOR OUR DIALOGUE WITH AFRICAN NATIONS AND OTHER SUPPLIERS;

--TO CONCENTRATE OUR RESTRAINT EFFORTS ON REDUCING THE TENSIONS AND ATTENDANT LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT IN THE REGION BY SEEKING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS. THESE TENSIONS WERE OFTEN EXACERBATED, AS THE US HAD DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, BY QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITATIVE ARMS IMBALANCES.

36. NOTING HE WAS NOT TRYING TO BE OVERLY DRAMATIC, GELB SAID THE US AND USSR WERE AT THE CROSSROADS WITH
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RESPECT TO TRANSFERS OF ARMS TO AFRICA. THE SOVIETS HAD TRANSFERRED ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES SUCH AS ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA, AND LIBYA. BECAUSE OF THOSE TRANSFERS, THE US WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN TO SUPPLY ARMS TO RESTORE SOME SEMBLANCE OF BALANCE TO THESE AREAS, BUT WHAT WE DID HERE AND WHAT RECEPTION WE COULD GET FOR ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT FROM AFRICAN NATIONS COULD AFFECT THIS SITUATION. HOW FAR THE US WOULD GO WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO PROVIDE EXCESSIVE QUANTITIES OF ARMS. IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE PREPARED TO SHOW RESTRAINT, NAMELY, TO HOLD DOWN ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE PROVISION OF FOLLOW-ON SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION, WE WOULD TAKE THAT INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR APPROACH. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED LARGE-SCALE TRANSFERS, THIS TOO WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON OUR POLICY. THE US SIDE PLANNED TO DISCUSS THESE CONCRETE, SERIOUS, PRACTICAL MATTERS IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP.

37. IN CLOSING, GELB SAID HE WOULD ADD ONLY ONE POINT. THE US DID NOT VISUALIZE THIS ENTERPRISE AS AN ENDLESS NEGOTIATION. THE US HAD COME HERE WITH SPECIFIC PRO-

POSALS ON CRITERIA AND ON REGIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. BOTH SIDES, GELB EMPHASIZED, WOULD ASSESS THE FUTURE WORTHINESS OF THIS ENTERPRISE BY WHAT WE COULD ACCOMPLISH AT THIS ROUND.

38. MENDELEVICH RESPONDED TO GELB'S REMARKS BY AGREEING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO DID NOT WANT ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS. THERE MUST BE PROGRESS IN THIS THIRD ROUND, BUT IT DID NOT HAVE TO HAVE A FINAL CHARACTER. NEVERTHELESS, IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT WANT THERE TO BE A BREAK IN THE ROUNDS OF TALKS WHEN THERE
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WERE NO GROUNDS FOR EXPLAINING IT AND FOR THIS REASON THE ENTERPRISE SHOULD NOT STOP WITHOUT PROPER EXPLANATIONS. (COMMENT: MENDELEVICH HERE WAS MAKING A CLEAR REFERENCE TO THE SUSPENDED INDIAN OCEAN TALKS). MENDELEVICH THOUGHT THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US ON COMPARING THE ROLES OF POLITICAL/LEGAL AND MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA. ALTHOUGH MENDELEVICH HAD SAID THAT POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA WERE CENTRAL, THIS WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO MILITARY/TECHNICAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS. THE RESULTS OF OUR WORK COULD ENCOMPASS ALL ELEMENTS OF OUR WORK.

39. MENDELEVICH REFERRED TO GELB'S REMARKS ABOUT THE OBJECTIVITY OF DETERMINING WHETHER STATE X WAS GOOD VERSUS WHETHER THE SUPPLY OF NEW AND MODERN WEAPONS WOULD BE A NEW ENTERPRISE. CERTAINLY, MENDELEVICH COULD AGREE THAT THE SECON ELEMENT IN THIS CASE WOULD BE MORE OBJECTIVE. BUT PERHAPS THE QUESTION WAS NOT PROPERLY PUT. THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED A CONCRETE SYSTEM OF CRITERIA WHICH DID NOT INTRODUCE GOOD AND EVIL IN GENERAL. FOR EXAMPLE, DID A STATE HAVE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON ITS NEIGHBOR, YES OR NO ONE COULD GIVE AN OBJECTIVE ANSWER. SIMILARLY, IF A STATE SYSTEMATICALLY REFUSES TO BE A PARTY TO AGREEMENTS ON CURBING THE ARMS RACE, ON COULD SAY YES OR NO. AND THE SAME AGAIN FOR STATES CONDUCTING A RACIST POLICY OR OCCUPYING ANOTHER STATE.

40. AT THIS POINT MENDELEVICH DISINGENUOUSLY READ ALOUD A NUMBER OF POLICY OBJECTIVES GOVERNING THE ARMS TRANSFER POLICY OF A "CERTAIN STATE." THESE TURNED OUT TO BE THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS TRANSFERS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS OF JULY 11, 1977. MENDELEVICH POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS DOING THIS IN THE SENSE OF A SEMINAR RATHER THAN AS PART OF SERIOUS DISCUSSION. BUT, HE ADDED, "IN ALL SERIOUSNESS WE WANT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD MAKE THESE OBJECTIVES ILLEGAL." THE SOVIET
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SIDE, HE SAID, WANTED TO ELIMINATE ARMS SUPPLIES AS NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY AND THIS WAS WHY IT STRESSED POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA SO MUCH.

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41. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT, LIKE THE US, THE USSR HAD ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE DECLARATION OF THE AYACUCHO COUNTRIES AND STUDIED IT WITH INTEREST. THEY WOULD EXAMINE IT FURTHER SINCE IT WAS A SERIOUS MATTER AND DIRECTION. HE ASKED GELB IF HE MIGHT GET A COPY OF THE OAS (MEXICALN) RESOLUTION, WHICH GELB PROVIDED.

42. ON AFRICA, MENDELEVICH CRITICIZED THE WESTERN INTERVENTION IN SHABA PROVINCE SINCE THE ENTIRE WORLD KNEW HOW MANY AFRICAN CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY FOREIGN LEGIONAIRES THERE. HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON US GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THIS OPERATION, BUT IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT THE LEGIONAIRES WOULD PAY FOR WHAT THEY DID IN SHABA. OF COURSE, THERE HAD BEEN NO US FORCES THERE. AS FOR ETHIOPIA, GELB HAD SAID THAT THE USSR SUPPLIED LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS. ETHIOPIA WAS A VICTIM OF AGGRESSION AND THE SOVIETS HELPED WHEREAS THE US DID NOT. THIS WAS WHY ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CRITERIA WAS THAT OF RENDERING SUPPORT TO VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION. OF COURSE, THIS WAS NOT AN OBLIGATION, BUT THE US COULD NOT REPROACH THE USSR BECAUSE IT HELPED. IN SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION, MENDELEVICH SIAD HE BELIEVED THAT TODAY'S SESSION SHOWED THAT WE WERE APPROACHING CLOSER TO THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEMS WE SHOULD DEAL WITH, AND THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO DO SO VERY ACTIVELY.

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43. FOLLOWING MENDELEVICH'S REMARKS, GELB SAID HE FOUND MENDELEVICH'S RENDITION OF THE HISTORIC SITUATION IN THE HORN SOMEWHAT SKEWED. HERE WAS A SITUATION FOR APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE NOT TO SUPPORT STATES WITH CLAIMS AGAINST THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE. AND YET WHO HAD SUPPLIED SOMALIA WITH ARMS TO GO INTO ETHIOPIA? WAS IT ECUADOR? IN THE CASE OF CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA, THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT IN THAT AN EXTERNAL FORCE WAS IN PERMANENT RESIDENCE WITH ATTENDANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AFRICANS AND THE US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

44. REGARDING SHABA PROVINCE, GELB SAID SOVIET FORCES SHOULD HAVE JOINED THE FRENCH LEGIONAIRES BECAUSE THE FRENCH WERE LEGITIMATELY DEFENDING INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TERRITORY IN ZAIRE. THE US HAS SUPPORTED NEITHER THE SOMALIS NOR THE KATANGESE.

45. GELB INDICATED HE HAD SAID THESE THINGS NOT TO ENGAGE IN RECRIMINATIONS ABOUT PAST EVENTS, BUT TO MAKE A POINT; NAMELY, THE US DID TAKE POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA SERIOUSLY BUT STILL FELT THAT THEY WERE NOT ENOUGH. THAT WAS THE MORAL OF GELB'S RHETORICAL QUESTION. GELB SAID IT WOULD TAKE BOTH THE US AND USSR AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO REGULATE ARMS TRANSFERS. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT REGULATION, NOT ELIMINATION OF TRANSFERS.

46. GELB SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH SILENT PRESSURE TO MENDELEVICH'S QUOTING FROM THE DOCUMENT WHICH HE HAD HAD A HAND IN WRITING. HE NOTED JOCULARLY THAT SOVIET FOREIGN MILITARY SALES WERE SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CONTINUING IN A SERIOUS VEIN,

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GELB SAID THE US HAD ACKNOWLEDGED EARLIER THE OBJECTIVES IT PURSUED THROUGH ARMS SALES AS A WAY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD AND US NATIONAL INTERESTS, JUST AS THE SOVIET UNION DID. THE TASK FOR RESTRAINT WAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE COMPLEXITIES IN-

HERENT IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS.

47. AFTER DISCUSSING SOME ADMINISTRATION MATTERS, GELB
ADJOURNED THE FIRST SESSION.

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Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014